Is Bolt safe on LinkedIn in 2026?

No — LinkedIn detects Bolt (we checked it November 6, 2026). Bolt's extension ID is on LinkedIn's AED detection list (Nov 2026 snapshot), and LinkedIn's page code checks for Bolt on every visit by requesting chrome-extension://oncifabpfdcgbfleplbnclkaakfmjjid/content-script/main-gmail.js — a file that exists only if Bolt is installed. Our automated scan of Bolt 7.3.0 found code that references LinkedIn's session cookie li_at (1 matches in 1 files); whether Bolt sends that cookie anywhere needs a manual dataflow review.

Updated November 6, 2026 · LinkedIn AED snapshot Nov 2026

ID: oncifabpfdcgbfleplbnclkaakfmjjid

Does LinkedIn detect Bolt? What we found in its code

Detected by LinkedIn

This browser extension is actively compiled into LinkedIn's frontend detection lists. LinkedIn's scripts can detect when this is active on your browser.

LinkedIn requests: chrome-extension://oncifabpfdcgbfleplbnclkaakfmjjid/content-script/main-gmail.js

DETECTED

What this means: detection isn't an instant ban — it's one input to LinkedIn's risk score. But it's a standing signal: it stacks with your behavior (volume, programmatic clicks) and device fingerprint, and this is just the AED list — one of LinkedIn's three detection systems (see how it works).

What our automated scan found in Bolt's code

We downloaded Bolt version 7.3.0 from the Chrome Web Store on November 2, 2026 and searched its 10 code files for the patterns below. Each line shows the first place we found it.

Bolt's code references li_at — LinkedIn's session cookie, the one that keeps you logged in. 1 match in 1 file — first at background/main.js:275.
Bolt's code references JSESSIONID — LinkedIn's CSRF cookie, needed to call LinkedIn's internal API as you. 30 matches in 2 files — first at background/main.js:20.
Bolt's code calls paths of LinkedIn's internal Voyager API (voyager/api). 48 matches in 2 files — first at background/main.js:20.
Bolt uses the Chrome cookies API (chrome.cookies), which reads cookies of every site it has access to. 5 matches in 1 file — first at background/main.js:277.
Bolt reads or writes document.cookie inside pages. 9 matches in 3 files — first at background/main.js:22.
Bolt creates synthetic clicks or keystrokes (dispatchEvent / MouseEvent) — LinkedIn can tell these from real input (isTrusted=false). 65 matches in 4 files — first at background/main.js:88.
Bolt makes its own network requests (fetch / XHR / WebSocket). 164 matches in 4 files — first at background/main.js:20.
Bolt's code mentions linkedin.com. 132 matches in 5 files — first at background/main.js:20.

Permissions Bolt asks for

cookiesstorageactiveTabtabsalarmsdeclarativeNetRequestscriptingpowerhttps://*.crono.one/*https://*.linkedin.com/*https://*.hubspot.com/*https://*.lightning.force.com/*https://*.pipedrive.com/*https://mail.google.com/*https://*.googleusercontent.com/*https://outlook.office.com/*https://*.g2.com/*https://app.attio.com/*

What this scan is — and isn't. It is an automated static search of the shipped package, not a full teardown: a match means the pattern is in the code, not that Bolt misuses it, and no match doesn't prove absence (minified or runtime-built code can hide it). We haven't traced where Bolt sends data. How we test

How LinkedIn checks for Bolt: the AED probe

That verdict isn't a guess. This is what LinkedIn's own page code does on every visit — simplified from its production bundle, which the BrowserGate investigation reverse-engineered line by line:

// LinkedIn's page bundle — simplified from BrowserGate's teardown

const hits = [];

for (const { id, file } of AED_LIST) // 4,934 ids incl. this one

try { await fetch("chrome-extension://" + id + "/" + file); hits.push(id); }

catch {} // not installed → silently swallowed

fireTrackingPayload("AedEvent", { browserExtensionIds: hits }); // → POST /li/track

// this extension is probed at:
// chrome-extension://oncifabpfdcgbfleplbnclkaakfmjjid/content-script/main-gmail.js

On LinkedIn’s AED list

Yes

1 of 4,934 · snapshot Nov 2026

URL LinkedIn requests

chrome-extension://oncifabpfdcgbfleplbnclkaakfmjjid/content-script/main-gmail.js

the extension's ID + a file bundled inside it

Store status

Live on the Web Store

Source

LinkedIn bundle

ℹVerify it yourself: on linkedin.com open DevTools → Sources and search the page bundle for oncifabpfdcg… or AedEvent; or Network → filter li/track to watch the verdict ship. The scan runs even in Incognito. Below — the full code-level teardown.

Bolt — marketed on the Chrome Web Store, detected by LinkedIn — Vendor's own Chrome Web Store screenshot — this extension is on LinkedIn's detection list.

How LinkedIn fingerprints your browser while you use Bolt

Even after a cookie is copied out, LinkedIn keeps one more receipt on every request that follows — a 48-point snapshot of the exact machine making it. Faking it convincingly means reproducing that machine's quirks, not just editing a string.

Click any signal above for what it means. These are illustrative values — this demo never reads your actual device.

Your 48-point fingerprint — RSA-encrypted, attached to every API call in this session, not just login

This extension runs inside your real browser, so its requests always carry your real fingerprint — that isn't something it controls, it's simply where its code executes.

Verified against LinkedIn source-code, Nov 2026 snapshot.Read full study