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Safe Outreach

Is Deep Enrich safe on LinkedIn in 2026?

No — LinkedIn detects Deep Enrich (we checked it ). Deep Enrich's extension ID is on LinkedIn's AED detection list (Nov 2026 snapshot), and LinkedIn's page code checks for Deep Enrich on every visit by requesting chrome-extension://nlpbchdbcdcnemmjamdodbhbodfalklp/dist/app.js — a file that exists only if Deep Enrich is installed. Our automated scan of Deep Enrich 0.4.0 found code that references LinkedIn's session cookie li_at (2 matches in 1 files); whether Deep Enrich sends that cookie anywhere needs a manual dataflow review.

Updated · LinkedIn AED snapshot Nov 2026

ID: nlpbchdbcdcnemmjamdodbhbodfalklp

Does LinkedIn detect Deep Enrich? What we found in its code

Detected by LinkedIn

This browser extension is actively compiled into LinkedIn's frontend detection lists. LinkedIn's scripts can detect when this is active on your browser.

LinkedIn requests: chrome-extension://nlpbchdbcdcnemmjamdodbhbodfalklp/dist/app.js
DETECTED

What this means: detection isn't an instant ban — it's one input to LinkedIn's risk score. But it's a standing signal: it stacks with your behavior (volume, programmatic clicks) and device fingerprint, and this is just the AED list — one of LinkedIn's three detection systems (see how it works).

What our automated scan found in Deep Enrich's code

We downloaded Deep Enrich version 0.4.0 from the Chrome Web Store on and searched its 15 code files for the patterns below. Each line shows the first place we found it.

  • Deep Enrich's code references li_at — LinkedIn's session cookie, the one that keeps you logged in. 2 matches in 1 file — first at crawler.js:24.
  • Deep Enrich's code references JSESSIONID — LinkedIn's CSRF cookie, needed to call LinkedIn's internal API as you. 2 matches in 2 files — first at crawler.js:34.
  • Deep Enrich's code calls paths of LinkedIn's internal Voyager API (voyager/api). 3 matches in 3 files — first at dist/app.js:14262.
  • Deep Enrich uses the Chrome cookies API (chrome.cookies), which reads cookies of every site it has access to. 3 matches in 1 file — first at crawler.js:23.
  • Deep Enrich reads or writes document.cookie inside pages. 1 match in 1 file — first at dist/app.js:14329.
  • Deep Enrich creates synthetic clicks or keystrokes (dispatchEvent / MouseEvent) — LinkedIn can tell these from real input (isTrusted=false). 2 matches in 1 file — first at dist/app.js:12960.
  • Deep Enrich runs code built at runtime (eval / new Function). 1 match in 1 file — first at dist/app.js:2799.
  • Deep Enrich makes its own network requests (fetch / XHR / WebSocket). 7 matches in 3 files — first at service_worker.js:178.
  • Deep Enrich's code mentions linkedin.com. 24 matches in 7 files — first at crawler.js:9.
Permissions Deep Enrich asks for
storagescriptingactiveTabalarmscookieshttps://www.linkedin.com/*https://*.deepenrich.com/*https://deepenrich.com/*

What this scan is — and isn't. It is an automated static search of the shipped package, not a full teardown: a match means the pattern is in the code, not that Deep Enrich misuses it, and no match doesn't prove absence (minified or runtime-built code can hide it). We haven't traced where Deep Enrich sends data. How we test

How LinkedIn checks for Deep Enrich: the AED probe

That verdict isn't a guess. This is what LinkedIn's own page code does on every visit — simplified from its production bundle, which the BrowserGate investigation reverse-engineered line by line:

// LinkedIn's page bundle — simplified from BrowserGate's teardown
const hits = [];
for (const { id, file } of AED_LIST) // 4,934 ids incl. this one
try { await fetch("chrome-extension://" + id + "/" + file); hits.push(id); }
catch {} // not installed → silently swallowed
fireTrackingPayload("AedEvent", { browserExtensionIds: hits }); // → POST /li/track
// this extension is probed at:
// chrome-extension://nlpbchdbcdcnemmjamdodbhbodfalklp/dist/app.js
On LinkedIn’s AED list
Yes
1 of 4,934 · snapshot Nov 2026
URL LinkedIn requests
chrome-extension://nlpbchdbcdcnemmjamdodbhbodfalklp/dist/app.js
the extension's ID + a file bundled inside it
Store status
Live on the Web Store
Source
LinkedIn bundle
ℹVerify it yourself: on linkedin.com open DevTools → Sources and search the page bundle for nlpbchdbcdcn… or AedEvent; or Network → filter li/track to watch the verdict ship. The scan runs even in Incognito. Below — the full code-level teardown.
Deep Enrich — marketed on the Chrome Web Store, detected by LinkedIn
Vendor's own Chrome Web Store screenshot — this extension is on LinkedIn's detection list.

How LinkedIn fingerprints your browser while you use Deep Enrich

Even after a cookie is copied out, LinkedIn keeps one more receipt on every request that follows — a 48-point snapshot of the exact machine making it. Faking it convincingly means reproducing that machine's quirks, not just editing a string.

Click any signal above for what it means. These are illustrative values — this demo never reads your actual device.

Your 48-point fingerprint — RSA-encrypted, attached to every API call in this session, not just login

This extension runs inside your real browser, so its requests always carry your real fingerprint — that isn't something it controls, it's simply where its code executes.

Verified against LinkedIn source-code, Nov 2026 snapshot.Read full study

Similar LinkedIn tools we checked

Same architecture and risk as Deep Enrich — each with its own code audit.

All extension checks