Is GiveMeLeads v1.50 safe on LinkedIn in 2026?

No — LinkedIn detects GiveMeLeads v1.50 (we checked it ). GiveMeLeads v1.50's extension ID is on LinkedIn's AED detection list (Nov 2026 snapshot), and LinkedIn's page code checks for GiveMeLeads v1.50 on every visit by requesting chrome-extension://odbolahfpokkpegkdaoigkpjiboalkjl/icons/logo-standalone-white-no-bg-small.png — a file that exists only if GiveMeLeads v1.50 is installed. Our code teardown rates GiveMeLeads v1.50 HIGH risk: GiveMeLeads v1.50 hands your LinkedIn session off to the vendor's cloud after a click.

Updated · LinkedIn AED snapshot Nov 2026

ID: odbolahfpokkpegkdaoigkpjiboalkjl

Does LinkedIn detect GiveMeLeads v1.50? What we found in its code

Everything we confirmed in GiveMeLeads v1.50's code, grouped by what it means for your account. Red = strongest detection / risk signals, amber = notable, grey = neutral or local-only.

Detected by LinkedIn

This browser extension is actively compiled into LinkedIn's frontend detection lists. LinkedIn's scripts can detect when this is active on your browser.

LinkedIn requests: chrome-extension://odbolahfpokkpegkdaoigkpjiboalkjl/icons/logo-standalone-white-no-bg-small.png
DETECTED

What this means: detection isn't an instant ban — it's one input to LinkedIn's risk score. But it's a standing signal: it stacks with your behavior (volume, programmatic clicks) and device fingerprint, and this is just the AED list — one of LinkedIn's three detection systems (see how it works).

We read GiveMeLeads v1.50's codeHIGH RISK

Hands your session to its cloud (one click) · on LinkedIn's detection list

GiveMeLeads v1.50's detection surface

Signals LinkedIn's own page scripts can pick up directly on every visit — the extension probe (AED), code injected into the page (Spectroscopy), fake (isTrusted:false) clicks, blocked/missing telemetry, and cloud remote-control. Each adds points to its risk score.

AED-listed · probe chrome-extension://odbolahfpokkpegkdaoigkpjiboalkjl/icons/logo-standalone-white-no-bg-small.pngInjects into LinkedInSynthetic clicks (isTrusted:false)

What GiveMeLeads v1.50 does with your session

How the tool touches your LinkedIn login. If it uploads your session cookie to the vendor's cloud, the vendor can act as you from another IP — LinkedIn's loudest parallel-access tell. Reading the cookie locally (csrf/Voyager) is far less risky.

session upload suspectedreads li_atharvests cookie jar

Where GiveMeLeads v1.50 sends your data

Every outbound destination found in the code — your session / scraped data, plus analytics, CRM pushes and CAPTCHA-solving services. LinkedIn can't see these, but it's where your data actually ends up.

GiveMeLeads vendor URL opened with `li_at` and `li_a` query parameters

Permissions GiveMeLeads v1.50 requests

Chrome permissions the extension was granted on install. The highlighted ones are the powerful kind — cookies (read your session), webRequest/declarativeNetRequest (watch & rewrite traffic, incl. blocking LinkedIn's telemetry), scripting/tabs (inject into pages).

tabscookiesstorage

Evidence in GiveMeLeads v1.50's code (signal counts)

How many times each tell-tale pattern appears in the extension's code — the raw proof behind everything above (e.g. li_at = session-cookie reads, voyager/csrf = LinkedIn API calls, synthetic_event = fake clicks, recaptcha = challenge handling).

li_at ×2chrome_cookies ×1synthetic_event ×6
0 capabilities mapped · 0 settings · MV3

How LinkedIn checks for GiveMeLeads v1.50: the AED probe

That verdict isn't a guess. This is what LinkedIn's own page code does on every visit — simplified from its production bundle, which the BrowserGate investigation reverse-engineered line by line:

// LinkedIn's page bundle — simplified from BrowserGate's teardown
const hits = [];
for (const { id, file } of AED_LIST) // 4,934 ids incl. this one
try { await fetch("chrome-extension://" + id + "/" + file); hits.push(id); }
catch {} // not installed → silently swallowed
fireTrackingPayload("AedEvent", { browserExtensionIds: hits }); // → POST /li/track
// this extension is probed at:
// chrome-extension://odbolahfpokkpegkdaoigkpjiboalkjl/icons/logo-standalone-white-no-bg-small.png
On LinkedIn’s AED list
Yes
1 of 4,934 · snapshot Nov 2026
URL LinkedIn requests
chrome-extension://odbolahfpokkpegkdaoigkpjiboalkjl/icons/logo-standalone-white-no-bg-small.png
the extension's ID + a file bundled inside it
Probe-able files
2 exposed
files any page can load — LinkedIn can probe any of them
How LinkedIn labels it
“GiveMeLeads”
Store status
Live on the Web Store
Source
LinkedIn bundle
ℹVerify it yourself: on linkedin.com open DevTools → Sources and search the page bundle for odbolahfpokk… or AedEvent; or Network → filter li/track to watch the verdict ship. The scan runs even in Incognito. Below — the full code-level teardown.
GiveMeLeads v1.50 — marketed on the Chrome Web Store, detected by LinkedIn
Vendor's own Chrome Web Store screenshot — this extension is on LinkedIn's detection list.

How does GiveMeLeads v1.50 hook into your LinkedIn tab?

There's no 'authorize with LinkedIn' step anywhere. Simplified from its manifest — here's what actually happens between install and your first page load.

linkedin.com

Permissions granted on install:

tabscookiesstorage

3 permissions requested — no LinkedIn login involved

Step 1 of 3 — Install

Does GiveMeLeads v1.50 upload your LinkedIn session?

Where your session and data actually go, reconstructed from GiveMeLeads v1.50's code. GiveMeLeads v1.50 hands your li_at cookie off after a click — user-initiated, but the cloud still ends up acting as you.

hands off li_atacts as youAED probeSpectroscopy💻 Youyour LinkedIn session🧩 GiveMeLeads v1.50browser extensionLinkedIn☁️ Vendor cloudGiveMeLeads vendor URL open…
Sessions answering to this login right now: 1 → 2

red = your session/data leaving your machine · blue/green = stays local or only results leave · dashed = LinkedIn's own detection probes

ℹLinkedIn's own "where you're logged in" page does not gain a second entry from this — a replayed cookie isn't a new login, it's the same session answering from a second place.

Does GiveMeLeads v1.50 run a parallel LinkedIn session from another network?

LinkedIn doesn't need to know anything about proxies to catch this — it just needs one login cookie answering from two networks at the same time.

💻 Your deviceyour real networkLinkedIn☁️ GiveMeLeads ven…a second network⚠ same login, two networks

GiveMeLeads v1.50 uploads your session cookie, so it can answer from its own network at the same time you're logged in from yours — one login, two places, at once.

We actually measured this

We measured real exit-IP reputation for 7 vendor clouds in a dedicated study — GiveMeLeads v1.50's own infrastructure wasn't in that sample. The mechanism a session-upload creates is identical regardless: two networks, one cookie.

ℹCheck LinkedIn's own "where you're logged in" page after playing this — it stays unchanged, because to LinkedIn a replayed cookie was never a new login.

How we analysed GiveMeLeads v1.50's code

We downloaded GiveMeLeads v1.50's published Chrome Web Store package, de-minified it, and read it file by file — no live LinkedIn login. Two ways to see how:

Downloaded straight from the Chrome Web Store — the exact file your browser would install.

0/3 stages run
See the full method, step by step

How LinkedIn fingerprints your browser while you use GiveMeLeads v1.50

Even after a cookie is copied out, LinkedIn keeps one more receipt on every request that follows — a 48-point snapshot of the exact machine making it. Faking it convincingly means reproducing that machine's quirks, not just editing a string.

Click any signal above for what it means. These are illustrative values — this demo never reads your actual device.

Your 48-point fingerprint — RSA-encrypted, attached to every API call in this session, not just login

If this tool also uploads your session to another IP (see the data-flow section above), a cloud that never captured this exact fingerprint is highly likely to produce a mismatch on its very next request — server-side internals aren't observable from the code, so we hedge this as likely, not certain.

Verified against LinkedIn source-code, Nov 2026 snapshot.Read full study

Similar LinkedIn tools we checked

Same architecture and risk as GiveMeLeads v1.50 — each with its own code audit.

All extension checks

GiveMeLeads v1.50 FAQ

Is GiveMeLeads v1.50 safe to use on LinkedIn?

Our static code audit rates GiveMeLeads v1.50 HIGH risk — see the code-level breakdown above for exactly what it does and which detection signals it exposes.

Does LinkedIn detect GiveMeLeads v1.50?

Yes. GiveMeLeads v1.50's extension ID is on LinkedIn's active extension-detection (AED) list, so LinkedIn's page code probes for it on every visit (it requests the file icons/logo-standalone-white-no-bg-small.png) — LinkedIn knows the extension is installed before you do anything.

Can GiveMeLeads v1.50 get my LinkedIn account banned or restricted?

Detection isn't an instant ban — LinkedIn scores accounts on many cumulative signals. But GiveMeLeads v1.50 stacks a known extension ID on LinkedIn's list, code injected into the page, programmatic (isTrusted:false) clicks, and independent reviews report restrictions and permanent bans for Chrome-extension automators. Safe daily limits reduce the behavioral risk but can't offset a detectable architecture.

Does GiveMeLeads v1.50 have access to my LinkedIn account?

Effectively yes — it hands your LinkedIn session to GiveMeLeads vendor URL opened with `li_at` and `li_a` query parameters in one click, after which the vendor's cloud operates your account.

How does GiveMeLeads v1.50 work — is it a Chrome extension or a cloud tool?

GiveMeLeads v1.50 is a extension (URL credential handoff): the Chrome extension bridges your session to the vendor's cloud, which runs the automation server-side.

What is a safer alternative to GiveMeLeads v1.50?

A standalone desktop app such as Linked Helper removes the two extension-specific detection surfaces: there is no Chrome-Store ID for LinkedIn's AED scanner to probe and nothing injected into the page for its DOM scan, and your session never leaves your machine. No tool is unbannable, but the surface it exposes is far smaller.