Is Texts.com safe on LinkedIn in 2026?

No — LinkedIn detects Texts.com (we checked it November 6, 2026). Texts.com's extension ID is on LinkedIn's AED detection list (Nov 2026 snapshot), and LinkedIn's page code checks for Texts.com on every visit by requesting chrome-extension://gkhaokjljijoicfeblfolngmjieklihc/domInjector.bundle.js — a file that exists only if Texts.com is installed. Our automated scan of Texts.com 0.10.8 found code that references LinkedIn's session cookie li_at (5 matches in 5 files); whether Texts.com sends that cookie anywhere needs a manual dataflow review.

Updated November 6, 2026 · LinkedIn AED snapshot Nov 2026

ID: gkhaokjljijoicfeblfolngmjieklihc

Does LinkedIn detect Texts.com? What we found in its code

Detected by LinkedIn

This browser extension is actively compiled into LinkedIn's frontend detection lists. LinkedIn's scripts can detect when this is active on your browser.

LinkedIn requests: chrome-extension://gkhaokjljijoicfeblfolngmjieklihc/domInjector.bundle.js

DETECTED

What this means: detection isn't an instant ban — it's one input to LinkedIn's risk score. But it's a standing signal: it stacks with your behavior (volume, programmatic clicks) and device fingerprint, and this is just the AED list — one of LinkedIn's three detection systems (see how it works).

What our automated scan found in Texts.com's code

We downloaded Texts.com version 0.10.8 from the Chrome Web Store on November 2, 2026 and searched its 26 code files for the patterns below. Each line shows the first place we found it.

Texts.com's code references li_at — LinkedIn's session cookie, the one that keeps you logged in. 5 matches in 5 files — first at auth-google-chatContentScript.bundle.js:1.
Texts.com uses the Chrome cookies API (chrome.cookies), which reads cookies of every site it has access to. 1 match in 1 file — first at background.bundle.js:1.
Texts.com reads or writes document.cookie inside pages. 1 match in 1 file — first at assets/scripts/instagram-backup-code-fetcher.inject.js:1.
Texts.com runs code built at runtime (eval / new Function). 1 match in 1 file — first at authHelper.bundle.js:37.
Texts.com makes its own network requests (fetch / XHR / WebSocket). 5 matches in 5 files — first at auth-google-chatContentScript.bundle.js:1.
Texts.com's code mentions linkedin.com. 13 matches in 7 files — first at auth-google-chatContentScript.bundle.js:1.

Permissions Texts.com asks for

storagewebRequestscriptingcookiesdeclarativeNetRequest*://*.t.me/**://*.telegram.me/**://*.whatsapp.com/**://*.discord.com/**://*.facebook.com/**://*.instagram.com/**://*.linkedin.com/**://*.messenger.com/**://*.slack.com/**://*.texts.com/**://*.twitter.com/**://*.x.com/*

What this scan is — and isn't. It is an automated static search of the shipped package, not a full teardown: a match means the pattern is in the code, not that Texts.com misuses it, and no match doesn't prove absence (minified or runtime-built code can hide it). We haven't traced where Texts.com sends data. How we test

How LinkedIn checks for Texts.com: the AED probe

That verdict isn't a guess. This is what LinkedIn's own page code does on every visit — simplified from its production bundle, which the BrowserGate investigation reverse-engineered line by line:

// LinkedIn's page bundle — simplified from BrowserGate's teardown

const hits = [];

for (const { id, file } of AED_LIST) // 4,934 ids incl. this one

try { await fetch("chrome-extension://" + id + "/" + file); hits.push(id); }

catch {} // not installed → silently swallowed

fireTrackingPayload("AedEvent", { browserExtensionIds: hits }); // → POST /li/track

// this extension is probed at:
// chrome-extension://gkhaokjljijoicfeblfolngmjieklihc/domInjector.bundle.js

On LinkedIn’s AED list

Yes

1 of 4,934 · snapshot Nov 2026

URL LinkedIn requests

chrome-extension://gkhaokjljijoicfeblfolngmjieklihc/domInjector.bundle.js

the extension's ID + a file bundled inside it

Store status

Live on the Web Store

Source

LinkedIn bundle

ℹVerify it yourself: on linkedin.com open DevTools → Sources and search the page bundle for gkhaokjljijo… or AedEvent; or Network → filter li/track to watch the verdict ship. The scan runs even in Incognito. Below — the full code-level teardown.

Texts.com — marketed on the Chrome Web Store, detected by LinkedIn — Vendor's own Chrome Web Store screenshot — this extension is on LinkedIn's detection list.

How LinkedIn fingerprints your browser while you use Texts.com

Even after a cookie is copied out, LinkedIn keeps one more receipt on every request that follows — a 48-point snapshot of the exact machine making it. Faking it convincingly means reproducing that machine's quirks, not just editing a string.

Click any signal above for what it means. These are illustrative values — this demo never reads your actual device.

Your 48-point fingerprint — RSA-encrypted, attached to every API call in this session, not just login

This extension runs inside your real browser, so its requests always carry your real fingerprint — that isn't something it controls, it's simply where its code executes.

Verified against LinkedIn source-code, Nov 2026 snapshot.Read full study